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SUBMERGING ISLANDS:
TUVALU AND KIRIBATI AS CASE STUDIES
ILLUSTRATING THE NEED FOR A CLIMATE
REFUGEE TREATY
Rana Balesh*
INTRODUCTION
The effects of global climate change are being felt around the
world.1 The U.N. Human Rights Council has recognized that climate
change will significantly impact vulnerable populations.2 The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has confirmed that
anthropogenic sources affect climate change.3 Research has shown that
climate change is caused in part through human activities that cause the
release of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs).4 GHGs mainly come
from the burning of fossil fuels.5 When GHGs become trapped in the
atmosphere, they cause the Earth to warm.6 The Earth’s temperature has

* Rana Balesh received her juris doctor from Florida A&M University in December
2014. She recently passed the February 2015 New Bar Exam. Rana’s academic
interests include international law and human rights.
1
See Mary-Elena Carr, Madeleine Rubenstein, Alice Graff & Diego Villareal, Sea Level
Rise in a Changing Climate, in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS 15 (Michael B. Gerrard
& Gregory E. Wannier eds., 2013).
2
See U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 10/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/10/4 (Mar.
25,
2009),
available
at
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_10_4.pdf.
3
Samadu Atapattu, Climate Change, Human Rights and Forced Migration:
Implications for International Law, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 607 (2009).
4
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 4th Assessment Report, Synthesis
Report:
Summary
for
Policymakers,
at
6,
available
at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf (discussing that
GHG emissions will continue to increase in the future).
5
Causes
of
Climate
Change,
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/causes.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
6
Id.
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risen due to the additional GHGs in the atmosphere.7 The effects of
climate change cannot be ignored.8
Climate change has impacted the environment in many different
ways such as affecting the amount of rainfall per year and causing
changes to agriculture and forests.9 Climate change has also caused a
rise in sea levels.10 As a consequence of sea level rise, many island
states are experiencing coastal erosion.11
Small island developing states (SIDS) are particularly vulnerable to
the rise in sea level due to low elevations.12 The loss of territory is not
the only concern for SIDS as infrastructure and food sources are also at
risk.13 Unfortunately, many SIDS do not have the financial and
technological resources to effectively handle these issues.14 Many SIDS
are in danger of complete submersion.15
Many island indigenous peoples are connected to the land as it
provides them both their identity and livelihood.16 The loss of land for
indigenous peoples also means a loss of identity.17 Many island nations
will soon succumb to rising sea levels, causing indigenous populations
to be without homes; therefore, effective action must be taken soon.18
7

Id.
See, e.g., Atapattu, supra note 3, at 608 (discussing the impact of climate
change on forced migration).
9
Climate
Change
Impacts
and
Adopting
to
Change,
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2013).
10
See Coastal Areas: Climate Impacts on Coastal Areas, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/coasts.html (last visited Dec. 30,
2012).
11
Mary-Elena Carr et al., supra note 1, at 40.
12
Id.
13
Saving Paradise: Ensuring Sustainable Development, WMO (Dec. 30, 2012),
available
at
http://www.wmo.int/pages/publications/showcase/documents/WMO973.pdf
[hereinafter Saving Paradise].
14
Ana Weinbaum, Unjust Enrichment: An Alternative to Tort Law and Human
Rights in the Climate Change Context, 20 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 429, 430, 431 (2011).
15
Saving Paradise, supra note 13.
16
Keely Boom, The Rising Tide of International Climate Litigation: An
Illustrative hypothetical of Tuvalu v. Australia, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL REMEDIES, 409, 411 (Randall S. Abate & Elizabeth
Ann Kronk eds., 2013).
17
Id.
18
See Jane McAdam, Swimming Against the Tide: Why a Climate Change
Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer, 23 INT’L J. of REFUGEE L., 2, 8 (2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1714714
8
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Tuvalu and Kiribati are examples of states in the Pacific Ocean that
are being affected by climate change.19 They are both projected to
disappear by 2050.20 SIDS, such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, are utilizing
adaptation and mitigation strategies to cope with the effects of climate
change.21 The process of adaptation, as it is related to environmental
issues, refers to people’s ability to adjust to changes caused by climate
change.22 Adaptation measures include creating new ways to harvest
crops, water storage, relocating inland from the coast, and changing
governmental policies on climate change.23 Some states have formed
national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs), which identify and
prioritize adaptation needs.24 Both Tuvalu25 and Kiribati26 have
implemented NAPAs. Adaptation measures will not help some island
nations in the long term because total submersion into the ocean is
inevitable.27
In 2009, it was estimated that there are twenty-five to thirty million
environmentally displaced persons also known as climate change
refugees.28 This number is expected to increase to approximately 200
million by 2050.29 Climate refugees were first recognized in 1987 when
it was determined that many people were going to have to leave their
19

Our Pacific Neighbours on the Frontline, OXFAM AUSTRALIA
https://www.oxfam.org.au/explore/climate-change/impacts-of-climate-change/ourpacific-neighbours-on-the-frontline/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
20
McAdam, supra note 18, at 8.
21
See Ryan Jarvis, Sinking Nations and Climate Change Adaptation Strategies, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 447, 460 (2010). A discussion of climate change mitigation
is outside the scope of this paper.
22
Id.
23
Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in Small Island Developing
States, CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, 72 and 83, available at
https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/adverse_effects_and_response_measures_art_48/appli
cation/pdf/2007
02_sids_adaptation_bg.pdf.
24
Id.
25
Tuvalu’s National Adaptation Programme of Action, MINISTRY OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT, AGRICULTURE AND LANDS 22 (2007), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/tuv01.pdf.
26
Government of Kiribati, Republic of Kiribati National Adaptation Program of
Action (NAPA), 1 (2007), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/kir01.pdf.
27
McAdam, supra note 18, at 8.
28
Atapattu, supra note 3, at 610.
29
Id. at 611.
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homes in their native countries due to environmental factors.30 Citizens
of Tuvalu and Kiribati will have to leave their native countries because
the islands on which they reside are at risk of submersion.31
Although there is a growing recognition that climate displacement
is occurring, there is no comprehensive legal framework in place that
currently protects climate refugees.32 Unfortunately, there is no legal
instrument in existence under international law that provides climate
refugees the rights and protections they need for survival.33
Part I of this paper will address climate change, its effects on SIDS,
and the strategies utilized by Tuvalu and Kiribati to adapt to changes
caused by climate change.
Part II will analyze the existing legal
framework used to address the problems associated with island nations
losing its statehood and the rights and protections available to climate
refugees. Part III will address the need for a comprehensive climate
change refugee treaty that includes provisions for sovereignty,
relocation and funding. Tuvalu and Kiribati’s circumstances will be
used to illustrate this necessity by showing the effects of climate change
on island nations, the loss of territory and the need to relocate, and the
issues associated with financing the relocation process.
I. THE PLIGHT OF CLIMATE REFUGEES
A. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS
Climate is changing and Earth’s temperature is increasing.34
According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Earth’s
temperature has increased 1.4°F in the last century, and it is estimated
that it will rise an additional 2°F to 11.5°F in the next century.35
30

Id.
See Jenny G. Stoutenburg, When Do States Disappear? Thresholds of Effective
Statehood and the Continued Recognition of “Deterritorialized” Island States,
THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS 57, 58 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier eds.,
2013).
32
Jeremy Kelley, Climate Change and Small Island States: Adrift in a Raising
Sea of Legal Uncertainty, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, no. 2, 56, (2011),
available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1474&context=sdlp.
33
See id.
34
Climate
Change:
Basic
Information,
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basics/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). [hereinafter
EPA].
35
Id.
31
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Climate change is causing a rise in sea level.36 Rises in sea level occur
when the mass or volume of water increases in the Earth’s oceans.37
Sea level is measured by tide gauges and satellite altimeters.38 Tide
gauges measure changes in sea level relative to a height reference such
as land.39 According to Elena-Carr, the author of Sea Level Rise in a
Changing Climate, she has determined that there has been a rise in sea
level at a rate of 1.8 (±0.3) mean sea level/year “mm/y” between 1930
and 2000.40 Between 1993 and 2009, there has been an estimated rise in
sea level at a rate of 3.1 mm/y (± 0.4).41 The rise in sea level has also
been caused by melting glaciers and thermal expansion in the ocean.42
Studies have indicated that these two sources have caused the sea level
to rise 0.4-0.5 mm/y.43
There are conflicting projections on how much the sea level will
The Fifth Assessment Report of the
rise in the future.44
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has projected that
sea level will rise between .17m and .82m by 2100.45 However, another
study has indicated that sea level will rise between 75cm and 190cm by
2100 when taking into consideration the melting of polar ice sheets.46
The rise in sea level has impacted the environment in many
different ways.47 Studies have proven that rising sea levels create a
higher flood risk, causing coastal erosion and salt-water intrusion into

36

Mary Elena-Carr et al., supra note 1, at 15.
Id.
38
Id. at 17.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 19.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 21.
43
Id. (melting glaciers and thermal expansion is primarily occurring in Antarctica
and Greenland).
44
Id. at 32.
45
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 5th Assessment Report, Climate
Change
2013:
Summary
for
Policymakers,
at
21,
available
at.
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf
46
Martin Vermeer & Stefan Rahmstorf, Global Seal Level Linked to Global
Temperature, 106 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 21527, 21530 (2009).
47
Mostafa Naser, Climate Change, Environmental Degradation, and Migration:
A Complex Nexus, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. POL’Y REV. 713, 724 (2012), available at
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1550&context=wmelpr
37
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ground water.48 These impacts can threaten the island populations by
destroying food sources such as crops and access to fresh water.49 Rise
in sea level is also causing the degradation of coastal ecosystems, which
has a direct effect on island indigenous populations since their survival
is connected to the land on which they reside.50
B.

SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES

SIDS are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change due
to the locations.51 Climate change has impacted SIDS in many different
ways such as altering the weather by increasing storms like cyclones and
hurricanes.52 These types of weather events can cause damage to crops
and fisheries that not only affect the local economy, but also the
indigenous peoples’ livelihood as well.53 SIDS are vulnerable to rising
sea levels as it increases shoreline erosion, which in turn places island
states at risk of losing their homes and infrastructure.54 Many SIDS are
at risk of becoming uninhabitable.55 High population densities and
limited financial resources make it difficult for islands to take effective
action against the effects of climate change.56
Rising sea levels are causing islands to become completely
submerged by the ocean.57 Consequently, many island nations are at
risk of losing their territory.58 Island nations have taken adaptation
measures to combat this risk of their territories becoming

48

Mary-Elena Carr et al., supra note 1, at 42.
Naser, supra note 47, at 724.
50
See Mary-Elena Carr et al, supra note 1, at 42.
51
See id. at 41.
52
Climate Change: Small Island Developing States, CLIMATE CHANGE
SECRETARIAT
(2005),
available
at
http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/cc_sids.pdf.
53
The Impact of Climate Change on the Development Prospects of the Least
Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, UN-OHRLLS 29-30 (2009),
available at http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/LDC%20Documents
/The%20impact%20of%20CC%20on%20LDCs%20and%20SIDS%20for%20web.pdf
54
Mary-Elena Carr et al., supra note 1, at 43.
55
See, e.g. Stoutenburg, supra note 31, at 57 (arguing that a State can still exist
under international law even when they no longer meet the traditional requirements of
statehood).
56
Naser, supra note 47, at 724.
57
Kelley, supra note 32, at 56.
58
Id.
49
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uninhabitable.59 Scholars have suggested that island nations use both
hard and soft protection measures to protect against rising sea levels.60
For example, a hard protection measure could include the building of a
seawall, whereas a soft protection measure could include artificial
elevation of an island.61 The implementation of these measures can be
very problematic, however, especially in terms of cost as they are very
expensive.62 For example, it will cost the Marshall Islands $100 million
dollars to construct a sea wall.63 Migration is another adaptation
measure.64 Under this measure, people may migrate out of their home
countries, or within their country, which is internal migration.65 Since
1987, the issues surrounding climate refugees have been brought to the
public’s attention with increasing regularity.66
C.

CASE STUDIES IN PROSPECTIVE CLIMATE REFUGEES
1. Tuvalu

Tuvalu is located in the Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and
Australia.67 Tuvalu is less
than 2 meters above sea level and consists of nine islands.68 The
name, Tuvalu, actually means “eight islands together.”69 Tuvalu’s total
area is 26 square kilometers and ranks as the fourth smallest country in
the world.70 It has approximately 10,000 citizens.71 Its primary source
59

Stoutenburg, supra note 31, at 62 (stating that SIDS should use protection
measures to keep from submerging completely into the ocean).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Erika J. Techera, Climate Change, Legal Governance and the Pacific Islands,
CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL REMEDIES, 339,
351 (Randall S. Abate & Elizabeth Ann Kronk eds., 2013).
63
See id. at 615.
64
Attapattu, supra note 3, at 613.
65
Id.
66
See id. at 610.
67
World Factbook: Tuvulu, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/tv.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
68
Boom, supra note 16, at 410.
69
See, e.g., About Tuvalu, http://www.tuvaluislands.com/about.htm (last visited
Nov. 10, 2013).
70
Id.
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of living is through fishing and farming.72 Tuvaluans are connected to
their land.73 Their land represents not only their home, but also their
identity.74 They live by the maxim, “land is life, without land there is no
life.”75 This connection between the people of Tuvalu and their land
means that the effects of climate change will not only mean a loss of
territory, but also a loss in cultural and social identity.76 Tuvaluans have
contributed very little to GHG emissions that cause climate change.77
Yet, Tuvalu is profoundly affected by climate change.78 Flooding
is a serious issue that has caused massive destruction to homes.79 It has
also caused saltwater contamination in inland soil and has resulted in the
death of coconut trees.80 In addition, drought has resulted in limiting the
supply of water.81 Tuvalu can desalinate the seawater, but it is too
expensive for Tuvalu to pursue by itself.82 In 2011, fresh water was in
such short supply that it caused local schools and hospitals to shut
down.83 New Zealand and Australia had to provide aid to Tuvalu during
that period.84

71

Boom, supra note 16, at 410.
Id.
73
Id. at 411.
74
Id
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 410.
78
Amelia H. Krales, As Danger Laps at Its Shores, Tuvalu Pleads for Action,
GREEN BLOG (Oct. 18, 2011, 5:00 AM),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/as-danger-laps-at-its-shores-tuvalu-pleadsfor-action/?_r=0 (Tuvaluan business owner stated, “I have been to the islets to get some
coconuts from a piece of land there and three-quarters had been taken away by the sea”
[hereinafter Tuvalu Pleads].
79
Id.
80
Tuvalu’s Views on Possible Security Implications, U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL
(2009),
available
at
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/ga-64/ccinputs/Tuvalu_CCIS.pdf [hereinafter Tuvalu’s Views].
81
See id.
82
Id.
83
See Australia, New Zealand in a Airlift to Drought-Hit Tuvalu , BBC NEWS
ASIA-PACIFIC (Oct. 7, 2011, 3:15 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific15210568.
84
Australia, New Zealand in a Airlift to Drought-Hit Tuvalu , BBC NEWS ASIAPACIFIC (Oct. 7, 2011, 3:15 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific15210568. Id.
72
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Shoreline erosion has caused a loss of farming land and a loss in
income.85 Farming in the inner part of the island has been affected
negatively because of the high level of salt in the soil and groundwater.86
In addition, there are concerns that the number of Tuvaluans that suffer
from illness and disease will increase in the future because of the lack of
drinking water and adequate food production in that country.87
Tuvalu is projected to disappear by 2050.88 In 2000, the Tuvaluan
government asked Australia and New Zealand to accept their citizens as
refugees.89 However, Australia is not accepting climate refugees at this
time, and New Zealand only accepts 75 citizens every year between the
ages of 18-45 through its labor migration program.90 New Zealand’s
policies regarding climate change refugees are insufficient.91 By 2050,
New Zealand will have only accepted 2,275 of Tuvalu’s 10,000
citizens.92 Furthermore, that does not include the number of Tuvaluans
that do not meet the requirements of New Zealand’s labor migration
program.93 Therefore, New Zealand’s labor migration program is not an
effective solution to climate displacement and other more effective
proposals need to be considered.94
In 2002, Tuvalu announced that it was considering a possible suit
against the United States and Australia in the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) over the negative effects of climate change stating that
these two countries are the most liable for releasing GHGs that are
contributing to climate change.95 However, Tuvalu will most likely find
it difficult to litigate this issue, as there are numerous issues with such a
case before the ICJ.96 For instance, the United States has not accepted
compulsory jurisdiction under the ICJ.97 If jurisdiction is established,
85

Krales, supra note 78.
Id.
87
Tuvalu’s Views, supra note 80.
88
McAdam, supra note 18, at 8.
89
World Factbook: Tuvalu, supra note 67.
90
Atapattu supra note 3, at 633.
91
Id.
92
See id.
93
See id.
94
See id.
95
Boom, supra note 16, at 412; See also Tiny Pacific Nation Takes on Australia,
BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1854118.stm.
96
Id. at 417-32
97
Id. at 421.
86
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Tuvalu will have difficulty proving breach and causation.98 For
example, Tuvalu will have to prove that Australia and the U.S. had an
obligation under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce emissions, but since it
failed to do so it has caused Tuvalu to suffer effects from climate
change.99 Tuvalu will have to resolve complex issues to bring a suit
against the United States and Australia in front of the ICJ.100
In 2009, the Tuvaluan Prime Minister Apisai Ielemia stated that
Tuvalu was not considering migration as a solution to their submerging
islands.101 He stated,
“[W]hile Tuvalu faces an uncertain future because of climate
change . . . it is our view that Tuvaluans will remain in Tuvalu. We will
fight to keep our country, our culture and our way of living. We are not
considering any migration scheme. We believe if the right actions are
taken to address climate change, Tuvalu will survive.”102
However, without an adequate legal framework to address climate
change, Tuvalu will not survive.103
2. Kiribati
Kiribati is also located in the Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and
Australia.104 It has a population size of 103,248 and half of the residents
live on the island of Tarawa.105 Kiribati is one of the impoverished
nations.106 For example, tourism and foreign aid combined amount to
40% to 45% of Kiribati’s GDP.107 Further, only 20% of Kiribatians
have access to sewer systems and 64% do not have bathroom
98

Id. at 417-32.
Id. at 427, 433.
100
Id. at 417-32.
101
Only if the Right Actions are Taken Will We Survive - Tuvalu PM Issues Call to
Save His Country From Extinction, LA TREIZIÈME ÉTOILE (Dec. 10, 2009),
http://www.andrewjburgesseu.blogspot.com/2009_12_06_archive.html (meetings took
place at the Parliament’s Committee on Development).
102
Id.
103
See Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal
for a Climate Refugee Treaty, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 357 (2009).
104
World Factbook: Kiribati, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/kr.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
105
Id.
106
Holly D. Lang, Comment, Climate Refugees Require Relocation Assistance:
Guaranteeing Adequate Land Assets Through Treatises Based on the National
Adaptation Programmes of Action, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 613, 617 (2010).
107
See id.
99
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facilities.108 Only 25% of the Kiribatian population is employed.109
Kiribatians earn approximately $2,800 dollar a year.110 Kirbati is deeply
affected by climate change and yet has contributed a very insignificant
amount to the emissions of GHGs.111
Kiribati is deeply affected by climate change.112 Two Kiribati
islands were already victims of rising sea levels in 1999.113
Additionally, there has been both coastal and inland erosion in
Kiribati.114 Due to this erosion, some Kiribatians have lost their
homes.115 Saltwater contamination has caused loss of crops116 and
livelihood.117 In addition, droughts have caused a loss of drinking water
and in some instances have affected fruit trees as well.118
Many Kiribatians have internally migrated to the capital of Kiribati,
Tawara, because of the effects of climate change.119 The population
increase in Tawara has caused a concern that illness and disease will
spread amongst the citizens in that area.120 Some Tawara residents live
in areas where they are not permitted to live, such as above freshwater

108

McAdam, supra note 18, at 9.
Id.
110
See Id.
111
Davina Wadley, Kiribati: Climate Change and Inequity, REFUGEES INT’L BLOG
(June 6, 2013), http://refugeesinte rnational.org/blog/kiribati-climate-change-andinequity.
112
Lang, supra note 106 at 617.
113
Id.
114
Kiribati: Climate Change, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KIRIBATI, http://www.climategov.ki/ca tegory/effects/coastal-erosion/ (last visited Nov.
11, 2013).
115
Id.
116
Time Running Out for Kiribati As Seas Rise: President, TERRA DAILY (Nov.
30,
2012),
http://www.terradaily.com/reports/Time_running_out_for_Kiribati_as_seas_rise_presid
ent_999.html.
117
See Wadley, supra note 111.
118
Drought Impacts Kiribati Southern Islands, RADIO AUSTL. (May 27, 2008,
1:12 PM), http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/droughtimpacts-kiribati-southern-islands.
119
See Wadley, supra note 111.
120
Id.
109
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containment areas, which results in the contamination of drinking and
bathing water, which is of great concern.121
Kiribati is also projected to disappear by 2050 due the loss of land
created by rising sea levels.122 The absence of high land in the Kiribati
islands makes the solution of long-term internal migration an
impossibility.123 President Anote Tong is attempting to utilize different
measures to find effective solutions to these issues rather than adopting
the strategies that the President of Tuvalu is currently implementing.124
The President of Kiribati would like to involve the international
community, by having other states recognize that climate change is
occurring, have these states take responsibility that they have
contributed to it, and help affected nations like Tuvalu and Kiribati with
financing relocation.125 President Tong has considered purchasing land
on Fiji’s main island and relocating Kiribatians to that specific
location.126 East Timor has also made an offer as a possible location for
Kiribatians relocation.127 Another potential solution for Kiribati’s
survival would be to purchase and relocate to Japan’s floating islands.128
Currently, the Kiribati government has not made a firm decision on the
actions they will take. However, President Tong has stated that
migration is not a choice, but is necessary for survival.129

121

Bernard Lagan, Kiribati: A Nation Going Under, THE GLOBAL MAIL (Apr. 15,
2013), http://www.theglobalmail.org/feature/kiribati-a-nation-going-under/590/.
122
McAdam, supra note 18, at 8.
123
Id. at 9.
124
Id. at 20 and 21.
125
Id.
126
Brigitte Leoni, Migration not a matter of choice but survival, says Kiribati
President, THE U.N. OFF. FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://www.unisdr.org/archive/25649.
127
East Timor Could Become Home to Kiribati’s Climate Refugees, RESPONDING
TO CLIMATE CHANGE (Sept. 20, 2012, 3:40 PM), http://www.rtcc.org/2012/09/20/easttimor-could-become-home-to-kiribati%E2%80%99s-climaterefugees/#sthash.uzjpvR9k.dpuf http.
128
Stoutenburg, supra note 31, at 63.
129
Leoni, supra note 126.
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II. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK FOR CLIMATE
REFUGEES
There is no comprehensive legal framework that exists that can
effectively protect the rights of climate refugees.130 Island nations like
Tuvalu and Kiribati have a very limited time frame to resolve these
issues before their territories become completely submerged. None of
the legal frameworks discussed below fully addresses the situation that
island nations now face.
A. SOVEREIGNTY
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of Man
(Montevideo Convention) is a treaty signed in Uruguay on December
26, 1934 at the International Conference of American States in
Montevideo, which addresses the criteria for statehood.131 Article one
of the Montevideo Convention requires that states have: “(1) a
permanent population, (2) a defined territory, (3) a government, and (4)
the ability to enter into relations with other states.”132 Island nation
states like Tuvalu and Kiribati will lose their territory (some states will
become uninhabitable before submerged); therefore, they will fail to
satisfy all four of the criteria that make them states under international
law.133
Article one of the Montevideo Convention requires that a, “state
possess a permanent population.”134 A permanent population could be
defined as an infrastructure system that provides for the survival of
human life and for the desires of its citizens to live in an organized and
communal society.135 If an island state is slowly disappearing into the
sea, as long as the state retains enough citizens to keep a community, it
130

Kelley, supra note 32, at 56 (stating that the two possible solutions to this
problem is to expand the legal definition to include climate refugees or create a new
convention).
131
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will still meet the criteria for a permanent population under the
Montevideo Convention.136 The Montevideo Convention does not
require a specific number of residents to meet the permanent population
requirement.137
Article one of the Montevideo Convention also requires that a state
possess, “a government.”138
The requirement of an effective
government has lessened after decolonization.139 The right to exercise
control is more important than the ability of actual control.140 Island
nations that keep a qualifying population on their islands will also meet
the criteria for effective government.141
The last requirement of article one of the Montevideo Convention
is that a State possess, “the capacity to enter into relations with other
states.”142 Many scholars have argued that there is an additional
requirement that states need to fulfill in this regard.143 This requirement
is a state’s independence.144 This independence requirement has both
factual and legal components.145 A state is factually independent if it is
self-sustaining and it is legally independent if it is not bound to another
State’s rule.146 However, some scholars contend that only legal
independence is needed.147 Nevertheless, under either interpretations,
once an island state is completely submerged, it will not meet this
requirement or any of the other criteria listed under the Montevideo
Convention.148
Island states have several options that would allow them to keep
their traditional statehood qualifications.149 Islands states could acquire
substitute territory as Kiribati desires to do or merge with other states.150
Island states also have the option of relocating to an artificial
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installation.151 Artificial installations utilize structures such as stilts and
moorings to indirectly connect them to the seafloor.152 It appears that
many states would consider these artificial installations as new
territories based upon ideas of fairness since many island nations are
facing submersion.153 In order to avoid potential problems, it would be
best if island states acquire new territory, so they can still be considered
states under the Montevideo Convention.154 If island states do nothing
and become victims to rising sea levels, they will no longer be
considered States under international law.155
B. REFUGEE STATUS
The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR) was
adopted on July 28, 1951 in Geneva, Switzerland.156 It defines the term
“refugee” and outlines the different types of legal protections they
receive under this Convention.157 The subsequent 1967 Protocol
expanded the geographic location of the problem beyond Europe.158
Article one of the CRSR defines refugee as:
“A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual

151
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residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear,
159
is unwilling to return to it . . .”

The CRSR does not apply to climate refugees. They do not meet
the legal definition stated in the Convention because they do not have a
fear of prosecution.160 Moreover, when there is a national disaster, like
a hurricane or tsunami, international law still requires states to maintain
responsibility over its citizens.161
The Maldives proposed amending the CRSR and expanding the
definition of refugee to include climate refugees in 2006.162 However,
there was opposition to this proposal as the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees argued that if the definition of refugees was expanded it would
compromise present standards.163
The UN Refugee Agency is
concerned that by expanding the current refugee definition it might
suggest that there is a connection between persecution and climate
change; under international law, climate refugees are not afforded the
same rights and protections as traditional refugees.164 Scholars have
advocated that the lack of protections and rights for climate refugees in
the current legal framework be analyzed instead.165 Additionally, the
UNHCR is facing pressure from host nations to limit the number of
climate refugees coming into their borders, but yet still the agency still
needs to find areas of relocation for these individuals.166
There are some regional instruments that have expanded the term
“refugee” to include climate refugees.167 The Cartagena Declaration on
Refugees (Cartagena Declaration) was adopted on November 22, 1984.
It expands the definition of refugee from the CRSR to include:
“[P]ersons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign

159
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aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or
168
other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”

Climate refugees would fall under the, “seriously disturbed public
order.”169 The refugee definition was expanded because it was found
that these individuals needed certain protections that weren’t afforded to
them at that time in Latin America.170 However, the Cartagena
Declaration is soft law and not binding.171 Even though this declaration
is soft law, it may provide a basis for the development of law that will
provide climate refugees in Latin America with lasting protection.172
A binding instrument, the Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, was adopted on September 10,
1969.173 It also expands the definition of refugee, stating “the term
“refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously
disturbing public order…”174 Climate refugee would fall under the
category of “seriously disturbing public order.”175 Although this
Convention reflects the evolution of the term refugee, it is a regional
instrument so it only applies to certain African countries such as
Algeria, Chad, and Gambia to name a few.176
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Guiding
Principles) were drafted in 1998.177 These principles were adopted as a

168
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response to the growing awareness of internal displacement that is often
the result of violence and family ties.178 It lists the rights and
protections afforded to the internally displaced.179 For instance, the
internally displaced are also defined as those who leave their homes,
because of “natural or human-made disasters . . . .”180 however, in its
application it does not include environmental devastation unless it is
considered a disaster.181 For example, certain effects of climate change
like desertification might not be considered a disaster under this
definition, so the Guiding Principles would not apply.182 Overall, there
are no binding legal instruments regarding climate refugees that will
protect inhabitants of island nations like those in Tuvalu and Kiribati.183
C. CLIMATE CHANGE TREATY SYSTEM
The objective of both the United Nations Framework Convention
(UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol is to mitigate the effects of climate
change.184 They were not created to address the issues surrounding
climate change refugees.
1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The UNFCCC was adopted by the United Nations on May 9,
1992.185 Since the UNFCCC is a framework convention, it does not list
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specific responsibilities.186 The objective of this treaty is to stabilize
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.187 The UNFCCC adopted the
precautionary principle and proposed returning to 1990 GHG emission
levels.188 In addition, the UNFCCC incorporates the principle of
common but differential responsibilities whereby developed countries
must assist developing countries that are being devastated by the effects
of climate change.189 Based on this principle, states give different
amounts of funds based on how much each nation contributed to
environmental problems.190 It also states that developed countries must
finance, facilitate, and provide access to technology to developing
nations to help them address the effects of climate change.191 Overall,
the UNFCCC does not place any legal obligations on those that are
parties to it.192
The UNFCCC does not contain any provisions regarding the
protection and rights of climate refugees.193 Island nations such as
Tuvalu and Kiribati cannot rely on this legal instrument as they try to
mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change.194
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2. Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol is part of the UNFCCC.195 It was adopted in
Japan on December 11, 1997.196 The Kyoto Protocol’s purpose is to
legally bind industrialized nations to reduce GHGs and carbon dioxide
(CO2) levels.197 It provides for a 5% reduction below 1990 levels in
GHG emissions between the years of 2008-2012.198 It appears that the
Kyoto Protocol has proved successful in various instances. For
example, in 2011 it was reported by the European Environmental
Agency that the EU’s current emissions was 18.4% lower than their
emissions levels had in 1990, which was attributed to their commitment
under the Kyoto Protocol.199 However, the United States has never
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, so it is not legally binding on the U.S.200
Furthermore, developing countries that are leading emitters of GHGs,
such as China, India, and Brazil, were not included in the Kyoto
Protocol.201 Some scholars have argued that the Kyoto Protocol failed
to provide the solution on climate change that it was created to
address.202
The Kyoto Protocol does not contain any provisions regarding the
protection and rights of climate refugees either.203 This Protocol may
legally cap emissions levels, but it does not make provisions that will
assist in the survival of submerging island nations.
D. HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights law may be applied to climate change; however,
there are challenges when utilizing a human rights framework to address
195
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climate change issues.204 Although human rights treaties have been
successful in many instances, these instruments do not adequately
protect climate refugees.205
1. Treaties
Human rights treaties have been successful in many different
situations.206 Thirty human rights treaties were adopted between the
years of 1948 and 2010.207 They have been successful in bringing
human rights abuses to light.208 For example, each year the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) receives in excess of 7,500
human rights complaints in expectation that human rights violations will
be made public, and efforts made to minimize them and facilitate
positive change.209 Other achievements in the field of human rights have
included additional protections to women, homosexuals, disabled
peoples, and indigenous communities.210 Additionally, the International
Criminal Court was established in 2002, and it has been successful in
holding individuals criminally liable for grave human rights abuses such
as genocide.211
Furthermore, citizens have been holding their
governments more accountable for human rights abuses in recent years
as well.212
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Notwithstanding all of these human rights achievements, there is
still no explicit right to a healthy environment under international law.213
The right to a healthy environment may be difficult to establish since it
would require states to provide protections to its citizens against
environmental degradation in order to ensure basic health standards.214
The right to a healthy environment must be linked to an established right
in order for it to be enforced.215 This link may be difficult to establish as
seen by the following human rights treaties.216
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
was adopted at the United Nations General Assembly on December 16,
1966.217 It includes a provision for the right to life,218 but it does not
include any articles on climate change.219 However, there is a link
between an established right in this treaty to climate change that island
states can attempt to utilize to bring forth complaints to the Human
Rights Committee.220 For instance, island nations may be able to bring
claims under articles six and twelve of the ICCPR.221 Under article six,
island nations such as Tuvalu and Kiribati can argue that their right to
life is being violated due to the effects of climate change.222 They can
also argue that their right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
their residence is being violated under article twelve.223 Nonetheless,
island states would most likely be more successful in litigation if there
were an express right to a healthy environment in the ICCPR.224
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) was adopted at the United Nations General Assembly
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on December 16, 1966.225 The ICESCR utilizes the progressive
realization principle, which recognizes that it is the states’
responsibilities to take measures that will fully implement the rights in
the ICESCR.226 However, the ICESCR does not include a right to a
healthy environment.227 The right to a healthy environment must be
linked to an established right in order for it to be enforced228 such as the
right to health.229 Island states can attempt to make a correlation
between the right to a healthy environment and the right to health.230 If
island nations find it difficult to make that link, it could be
problematic.231 There is no global human rights treaty that incorporates a
right to a healthy environment.232
2. Human Rights Resolutions
In 2008, the OHCHR studied the effects of climate change on
human rights.233 The OHCHR found that climate change impacted
many rights such as the right to life, right to water, and right to health.234
However, the OHCHR did not report that climate change threatened to
violate human rights; instead, it stated that there are three obstacles that
225
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must be overcome before it could be treated as a human rights
violation.235 The three obstacles are: (1) proving that one country’s
emissions caused a specific effect on another nation, (2) showing that
human right issues are caused solely by global warming, and (3) the
human rights framework is usually utilized in response to violations,
whereas climate change regulation is concerned with the potential of
future harm.236
In 2011, the OHCHR studied the correlation between human rights
and the environment for a second time.237 In 2012, John Knox was
chosen to be the first Independent Expert on Human Rights and the
Environment.238 In this position, Knox will investigate human rights
commitments relating to sustaining a healthy environment.239
Human rights frameworks cannot adequately address climate
change.240 Human rights treaties are concerned with the protection of
rights while climate change law is focused on solutions.241 Moreover,
the human rights framework was implemented before environmental
issues emerged.242 There is no legal framework in place currently that
will effectively protect the rights of climate refugees.243
III.

PROPOSAL FOR A CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEE TREATY

It appears that climate refugees rights’ are non-existent due to the
gap in existing legal frameworks.244 A climate change refugee treaty
will bridge that gap.245 This treaty needs to first define the term
“climate refugee.”246 The definition of this term has often been
235
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debated.247 The term “environmental refugee” has been advocated, but
is too broad to encompass the realities of climate refugees.248 It has
been advocated that the climate refugee definition should include the
following parts: “forced migration, temporary or permanent relocation,
movement across the borders, disruption consistent with climate change,
sudden or gradual environmental disruption, and a more than likely
standard for human contribution to the disruption.”249 This definition is
inclusive as it defines the circumstances of climate refugees.250
A. SOVEREIGNTY
A climate refugee treaty should incorporate provisions regarding
sovereignty. Submerging island nations are at risk of losing their
sovereignty as they would no longer meet the criteria that establishes
statehood by the Montevideo Convention.251 International law permits
one state to exist within another state; however, this is an unlikely
alternative.252 One of the criteria listed in article one of the Montevideo
Convention is a state’s ability to govern.253 States that are within other
states will most likely be unable to completely govern their new territory
as the host state will still maintain governing power, therefore the Home
state would not meet the government criteria listed in article one of the
Montevideo Convention.254
There is a viable solution to this problem. Nations that will become
victims to rising sea levels should purchase new territory and relocate to
that area.255 The government of Kiribati has been considering this
option in response to the conditions that they are suffering due to
climate change.256 This alternative will allow a relocating state to meet
247
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all the statehood criteria as defined in Article 1 of the Montevideo
Convention.257 However, resettlement is not a popular alternative to
many island states.258 Nevertheless, it appears the alternative to
resettlement, in the future, is complete submersion of islands states like
Tuvalu and Kiribati. Tuvalu is not even considering migration as an
option.259 This is unrealistic especially when there have been scientific
estimates that Tuvalu will be completely submerged by water by
2050.260 Due to these realities, a climate refugee treaty should contain a
provision that when a state faces extinction and purchases territory and
relocates their entire population, they should automatically be deemed a
state again. A state that relocates to another territory would still meet all
the requirements of Statehood as stated in the Montevideo Convention,
so this treaty provision would be consistent with international law.261
Alternatively, if relocation to a purchased territory is not an option,
the climate refugee treaty should also include a provision that is similar
to Professor Maxine Burkett’s proposal of a Nation ex-situ.262
“Ex-situ nationhood would be a status that allows for the continued
existence of a sovereign state, which would be afforded all the rights
and benefits of sovereignty among the family of nation-states . . . It is a
means of preserving the existing State and holding the resources and
well-being of its citizens—-in new and disparate locations.”263
This would allow for the existence of a deterritorialized state.264 In
this scenario, a decentralized state would still be considered a nation
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under international law.265 This provision would apply to states whose
citizens are migrating to different areas such as the Tuvaluans who have
entered New Zealand’s borders.266 However, given the novelty of this
idea, relocation to a purchased territory should take precedence.
1. Human Rights
The climate refugee treaty would need to include provisions that
incorporate human rights267 and property rights protections.268 The
climate refugee treaty should include rights such as those delineated in
the ICCPR and the ICESCR.269 A climate refugee treaty should
incorporate the right to self-determination.270 It enables climate refugees
to determine where and when they should relocate.271 It also empowers
climate refugees to make their own choices about their futures and
enables them to keep a strong link with their cultural traditions.272 A
climate refugee treaty should include the right to freedom of religion.
Climate refugees may not receive the same rights as those that are
citizens to the Host Country so this right ensures that they have freedom
to practice their religion. Climate refugees will be in a compromised
position if they are unable to maintain their culture in their new
relocated area.
A climate refugee treaty should incorporate rights that are in the
ICESCR.273 For instance, climate refugee treaty should incorporate a
right to work.274 Climate refugees need to work to support themselves
and their families. Employment will help climate refugees adapt to a
new area, and provides stability in the family and community life. A
climate refugee treaty should include a right to an adequate standard of
265
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living.275 If they are not afforded this right they will not be able to
survive because their basic needs will not be met.
A climate refugee should include a right to culture.276 Climate
refugees come from all parts of the world and will practice many
different traditions. This right will enable all climate refugees,
regardless of origin, to practice their traditions without the fear of
prosecution. This right is especially important for island indigenous
peoples because they have a special connection to their land.277
A climate refugee treaty should also include a right to safety and
security. The citizens of the Host state may be resentful that climate
refugees are residing in their territory, or host state citizens may think
that climate refugees are vulnerable since they are new to the area. This
right would offer physical protection to climate refugees. A right to
safety and security would alleviate fears that climate refugees may have
when relocating to a new area.
Property rights needs to be incorporated into a climate refugee
treaty as well.278 They are essential to successful relocation.279 It
promotes fiscal growth as it allows access for monetary lending, raises
property values, and increases stability.280 It has been advocated that
land should be sold on the private market to reduce complications
between individuals and States.281 Acquisition of property promotes
self-determination as it allows for individuals to purchase property in
areas that hold importance for them. “Ultimately, the quality of the
resettlement location plays a major role in the success of the
relocation.”282
2. Access to Social Services
Climate refugees will need social services once they relocate.283
Most home states will not be able to offer their citizens protections.284
275
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In response, a climate refugee treaty should include provisions that
provide climate refugees access to social services.285 Climate refugees
will need to have access to medical and health care after relocation.286
Climate refugees will not live in functional communities without access
to medical care. Furthermore, climate refugees that are ill due to limited
access to medical centers will not be able to effectively pursue their
right of self-determination as described in the ICCPR.287 They will be
unable to make decisions that will positively impact their lives because
they will not be healthy enough to do so. Access to medical care is a
necessity.
Climate refugee treaty should also contain a provision that will
provide access to language skills classes. Climate refugees may relocate
to states whose citizens speak a different language than their own. It is
important that climate refugees learn to speak the host states language,
so they can thrive in their new environment. This provision is especially
important since it is likely that educational and employment services
will be in the host state’s national language.
Climate refugees may have to accumulate to their new
environment. A climate refugee treaty should contain a provision that
provides services to help individuals with the transition into a new
climate. For instance, many Tuvaluans and Kiribatians are used to the
island weather, and it may difficult for them to adjust to a much colder
climate. A climate refugee treaty should contain a provision that allow
for clothing and other items that are necessary to adjust to the new
relocation area.
Climate refugees need to have access to education and job
training.288 They need to be employed to support themselves and their
families. A climate refugee treaty that contains an employment
provision will help climate refugees pursue the right to work article in
the ICESCR.289 Employment is necessary in order for climate refugees
to have the ability to pursue their right to self-determination as the funds
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284
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that employment provides will assist climate refugees in making choices
that will benefit their lives.
A climate refugee treaty should include a provision providing
climate refugees with transportation. Many climate refugees may not
have the means after relocation to purchase a vehicle or afford
transportation services, so it is important that a climate refugee treaty
address this issue. This is important since it is likely that climate
refugees will need transportation to carry out their daily activities.
B. LOGISTICS OF RELOCATION
The relocation of climate refugee will be a complicated process.
The proposed treaty should include the principle of proximity, which
states that people should be as close as possible to their native
location.290 This is especially important in the island nations context;
because many residents of SIDS have a special connection with their
land.291 Kiribati appears to be following the proximity principle since
they are considering the purchasing of land in Fiji,292 which is also
located in the South Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and New Zealand.293
A climate change treaty will need to have a relocation council that
will oversee relocation of climate refugees.294 It could be entitled,
“Climate Change Relocation Advisory Board,” also known as the
Advisory Board. The Advisory Board will have many duties. Its
primary purpose will be to help climate refugees’ transition from one
area to another.295 It would also provide guidance pertaining to the
appropriate location that climate refugees should relocate to.296 It will
help States decide what land to purchase.297 If climate refugees are
relocating to a host state and not to a territory that their home state
purchased, the Advisory Board can make recommendations on which
290
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host states would be the most appropriate for that climate refugee and
his or her families.298 The Advisory Board will act as a coordinator as it
will provide assistance with the preparation of relocation between
individuals, communities and states.299 Additionally, the Advisory
Board would help with the relocation itself by providing information to
the home state and its citizens on how to relocate efficiently.300
The Advisory Board will also help to solve issues that arise
between home and host states.301 It will act as an impartial mediator
between states so that it can take into account each state’s individual
needs.302 It will offer advisement on what the best course of action will
be for each state.303 For example, the Advisory Board might try to
convince the President of Tuvalu that not considering relocation as an
option to their survival problem is an unrealistic solution since the
nation will cease to exist in the near future.
C. FUNDING
A climate refugee treaty will need a source for funding. Currently,
there are different types of funds in place that can be utilized as a model
for this treaty.
1. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) under the Kyoto Protocol
The GCF’s purpose is to promote the realization of the goals of the
UNFCCC.304
It was adopted during the Conference of the Parties305 between
November 29, 2010 and December 10, 2010 in Durban, South Africa.306
298
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It was established in accordance with Article 11 of the UNFCCC and it
provides for developed nations to supply financial support to developing
nations.307 This financial support helps developing countries mitigate
and adapt to climate change.308 GCF has a goal to raise one billion
dollars a year until 2020.309 The GCF board, which consists of twentyfour members,310 has the responsibility to make decisions on how the
funds are appropriated.311 Revenue for the GCF is dependent on private
sources, developed nations, and other programs such as the carbon
market.312 The GCF should be in full effect by the end of 2013.313 It is
believed that the GCF will replace other climate change funds in
existence such as the Adaptation Fund.314 Tuvalu and Kiribati have both
ratified the Kyoto Protocol; therefore, once it is operational, the GCF
should help both the island nations finance adaptation measures.315
A climate refugee treaty will take time to develop, and climate
refugees need assistance now. Until a climate refugee treaty can be
developed, the GCF should include a sub-fund that provides monetary
assistance to climate refugees. This sub-fund can be called the, “Global
Refugee Fund” also known as the GRF. A portion of the revenue that
the GCF receives can be utilized by the GRF. The GRF will specifically
help to finance relocation of climate refugees. Relocation to a new area
is expensive, and many countries such as Tuvalu and Kiribati need
financial support. The GRF can help them finance it, until a climate
refugee treaty is developed.
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2. Climate Change Refugee Relocation Fund
A Climate Refugee treaty will need to have a fund that will provide
monetary assistance to
those that need to relocate. It could be entitled, “Climate Change
Relocation Fund,” also known as the Relocation Fund.
It can be
modeled after the GCF.316 Revenue can come from various sources
such as from Parties to the Convention and private donations. Parties to
the refugee treaty could contribute based on the principle of
differentiated responsibilities.317 This may also act as a deterrent for
nations that do not wish to lower their GHG emissions; they will be
heavily subsidizing this treaty. Each nation should receive funding based
on need, as many nations are suffering varying degrees of problems due
to climate change. For example, many island nations such as Tuvalu
and Kiribati are facing submersion and their need to relocate may be
greater than other States that have additional survival time.
Additionally, funds should not only be distributed to relocating states
but to host states as well. Host states should receive a flat rate per
climate refugee that enters into its borders. This would ensure fairness
between host states and would lower the probability of host states
deciding not to admit climate refugees into its borders due to funding
limitations.
The Relocation Fund would need to be overseen by two different
Boards. The first Board, could be modeled after the GCF Board which
would oversee the management and distribution of funds.318 The
Relocation Fund Financial Board (Financial Board) would be comprised
of Parties from both developed and developing nations.319 The
Relocation Fund would create the Scientific Experts Board (SEB) that
would work closely with the Financial Board.320 The SEB would be
comprised of unbiased scientific experts who would monitor the effects
of climate change and provide recommendations to the Financial Board
on the nations that have the greatest need for funds based upon the
imminent need for relocation.321
316
317
318
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CONCLUSION
The establishment of a climate refugee treaty is necessary to create
a more comprehensive legal framework for the protection of climate
refugees. The existing legal framework was structured during a period
when climate change had not been determined to be a problem, thus
making those existing laws inapplicable to the issues surrounding
climate change. The 1951 Refugee Convention only applies to refugees
that fear prosecution.322 Human rights law does not specifically apply to
environmental issues, and the existing climate change treaty system is
concerned with GHG’s in the atmosphere and not the protection of
climate change refugees.323 Unfortunately, the current international
legal system appears to offer no effective assistance to solving Tuvalu’s
and Kiribati’s significant survival problems related to climate change.
A climate refugee treaty can be a possible solution to protect
climate refugees. A climate refugee treaty will need to contain three
sections. These three sections would focus on sovereignty, logistics of
relocation, and funding. Sovereignty is important because a state that
becomes a victim to rising sea levels will no longer be considered a
nation under international law if it is submerged under water. States that
purchase territory and relocate its populations will still be deemed
nations under international law.324 Alternatively, if this is not an option,
a climate refugee treaty should also contain a provision that allows a
state to govern its people that are in different locations.325
Climate refugees’ rights need to be adequately protected under
international law especially once relocated. A climate refugee treaty
needs to explicitly state what rights refugees have in order to prevent the
possibility that their rights will be violated.326 It should also contain
provisions that grant climate refugees the right to access social
services.327 These provisions are essential to a climate refugee treaty, so
as to assist climate refugees in living happy and self-filling lives once
they are relocated.
A climate refugee treaty should incorporate the Relocation Fund,
which would be utilized to finance climate change relocation, and it can
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be modeled after the Green Climate Fund.328 Revenue will primarily be
obtained from Parties to the treaty. Parties will contribute funds based
upon the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.329 This
Fund will be utilized to make relocation a viable solution for all States
whose very survival is in danger. It will also provide monetary
assistance to host states that allow climate refugees into their borders.
This will allow for fairness amongst all nations. However, until the time
a climate refugee treaty is adopted, the GCF should incorporate the GRF
to help climate refugees relocate presently.330
The international community cannot ignore the problems associated
with climate change. The issues associated with climate change will
continue and a climate refugee treaty is a viable option. It will provide a
legal framework that will protect climate refugees and will provide
structure to States as well.

328
329
330

See Governing Instrument, supra note 304.
Docherty et al., supra note 190, at 386.
See Governing Instrument, supra note 304.

